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10/13/09 - CounterPunch The Untold Story of the Cuban Five: History Repeats
Itself

By RICARDO ALARCÓN de QUESADA

Just a couple of days after the Clinton White House encounter with García
Márquez, US diplomats in Havana approached Cuban authorities. We had a
number of discussions specially focused on what the US had found about
terrorist plots against civilian aircrafts and the warning that the FAA felt
obliged to issue. In the course of those exchanges the US asked formally for
a high level FBI delegation to come to Havana with a view toward receiving
from their counterparts our intelligence concerning the ongoing terrorist
campaign. In preparation for that visit an Assistant Secretary of State,
John Hamilton, communicated that "this time they would like to emphasize the
seriousness of the United States offer to investigate any evidence that
[Cuba] might have."

The meetings were held in Havana on June 16-17, 1998. The US team was given
copious information, both documentary and testimonies. The material handed
over included the investigations related to 31 terrorist acts, having taken
place between 1990 and 1998, including detailed information on the financing
of the most dangerous actions carried out by Luis Posada Carriles's network.
The information included lists and photographs of weapons, explosives and
other material seized in each case. Additionally, 51 pages with evidence
concerning how the money was routed to various groups for terrorist acts on
the island. The FBI also received tapes recording 14 phone conversations in
which Posada Carriles referred to violent attacks against Cuba. Specific
data was provided on how to locate the notorious murderer, such as his home
addresses, places he frequented, and his car number plates in El Salvador,
Honduras, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Panama.

The FBI took the files of 40 Cuban-born terrorists, most living in Miami,
and the clues to find each individual. The US delegation brought back with
them three 2-gramme samples of explosive substances from the bombs
deactivated before they could have exploded in the Melia Cohiba Hotel on
April 30, 1997 and in a tourist van on October 19, 1997, as well as the
explosive device confiscated from two Guatemalans on March 4, 1998.

The FBI was also given 5 video and 8 audio cassettes and their transcripts
with statements by the Central Americans who had been arrested for placing
bombs in hotels. There they talked about their links to Cuban gangs and in
particular to Posada Carriles.

The US side acknowledged the value of the information and made a commitment
to reply as soon as possible.

We never got a word back. Nobody knows for sure what the FBI did with the
evidence and the thorough information they received in Havana. They
certainly did not use it to arrest any of the criminals or to open any
investigations.

Wasn't the State Department any more worried with the information it had
gathered on its own concerning terrorist attacks against commercial
airlines? What happened with their preoccupation with the lives and security
of passengers, including American passengers?

Is that the way to "take immediate steps" on a problem "worthy of the full
attention of his Government, of which they would urgently take care" as
solemnly promised at the White House? Or "to emphasize the seriousness of
the United States"?

It may be assumed that the FBI shared the information they got with their
pals in Miami.

If facts have any meaning this must have been the case. On September 12,
1998, almost three months after the visit to Havana, we learnt through the
media about the detention of Gerardo, Ramón, Antonio, Fernando and René and
that Mr. Pesquera, the FBI chief in Miami, was, on that Saturday morning,
visiting with Ileana Ros Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart - the
Batista-Miami Congresspersons - to inform them of the incarceration of the
five Cubans.

History repeated itself. In 1996 President Clinton gave instructions to stop
Brothers to the Rescue air provocations, but when his orders reached Miami,
the local mob conspired to do exactly the opposite. In 1998 the very same
President appeared to be willing to put an end to terrorist attacks against
Cuba - and also against Americans - but when his intentions were learnt in
Miami, the FBI there blew them out.

Mr. Pesquera has recognized in a press interview that his main difficulty
was in getting Washington's authorization to apprehend the Five. It should
have been very hard, indeed. Was not Washington supposed to be on the other
side of the fence in the fight against terrorism?

But Mr. Pesquera and his cronies, won. They proved being able to ignore law
and decency, and to ridicule again the US Commander in Chief. Remember
Elian?

Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada is president of the Cuban National Assembly.